










Even  though  medieval  women  mystics  have  enjoyed  increased  attention  in  recent 
scholarly discussion,  a  topic  that  still has not been  tackled  is  the possible difference 
between  seeing  a  vision  and  hearing  a  voice  during  a  mystical  experience  and  the 
ramifications of  this difference  in  the context of medieval  text production and  in  the 
status  of  mystics  as  authors.  When  a  mystic  relates  a  mystical  experience,  she 
inevitably creates a text and becomes an author (Petroff 1986, 20–21). In the Christian 
Middle  Ages,  medieval  text  creation  hinged  on  authority  and  authorization,  as  an 
imitation of the creative power of God, the Master Author and the Logos (Word) itself, 
and thus has religious consequences for an aspiring author (Minnis 1988, 73). Bernard 
McGinn  points  to  this  logocentrality  of medieval writing:  “Jesus  the  preacher  of  the 
message became Jesus the preached message and soon Jesus the written message, as 












the Pauline  rule  on women’s  ecclesiastical  silence,  Jean Gerson’s  pronouncement  on 
Bridget  of  Sweden  at  the  Council  of  Constance  echoes  the  accepted medieval  norm: 
“‘All words and works of women must be held suspect’” (quoted in Lagorio 1984, 72). 
On the other hand, Petroff claims, “[v]isions led women to the acquisition of power in 
the world while  affirming  their  knowledge  of  themselves  as women. Visions were  a 
socially  sanctioned  activity  that  freed  a  woman  from  conventional  female  roles  by 
identifying  her  as  a  religious  figure  .  .  .  [and]  an  artist  “  (1994,  6).  But  as  the 








—  and  the  authentication  process  by  the  ecclesiastical  authorities.  For  the  vision‐
oriented mystic, the process of relaying the mystical message is more difficult, as she 
has  to  translate  the  visionary  tableau  into  a  text,  whereas  a  voice‐oriented  mystic 
needs only to repeat the words, which requires less participation on the mystic’s part. 
We  suggest,  therefore,  that  a  vision  is  simultaneously  both  a  greater  and  a  more 
indirect  claim  to  authorship  and  authentication,  while  a  voice  is  a  lesser  but  more 
direct claim. On the one hand, the mystic’s role  in creative translation of a tableau is 
greater,  but  her  claim  to  authorship  is  less  because  it  is  an  experience  with 
“intellectual words” (Underhill 1911, 329) that are interpreted as divine. On the other 
hand, the mystic’s relaying of a voice relegates her to the status of a mere mouthpiece, 
but  can  at  the  same  time  elevate  her message  to  one  that  derives  directly  from  the 
ultimate  divine  authorial  source  (Benz  1969,  648–649).2  Hildegard  claimed  in  her 
mystical  experiences  more  of  a  tableau  presented  as  a  written  text,  while  Joan’s 
message was both aurally received and orally transmitted, making her less credible as 
a  medieval  mystical  author.  Some  critics  might  object  here  that  Joan  cannot  be 
considered  an  author,  as  she  did  not  write  her  own words  down,  but,  by  virtue  of 




resembles  the  practice  of  female  medieval  writers  requiring  male  scribes  for 





her  adherence  to  particular  patriarchal  and  ecclesiastical  expectations,  generally 
determines  her  success  as mystic  and  author:  in  the  dichotomous  pair  of Hildegard 
and  Joan,  Hildegard  almost  always  claimed  visions,  foregrounded  her  mystical 
messages  with  the  politically  and  theologically  correct  rhetoric  of  the  time,  and 
actively solicited ecclesiastical support, whereas Joan — when pressed to divulge the 
content of her mystical experiences — claimed only revelation via  inferior voice, did 
not  foreground  her  mystical  messages  with  the  correct  rhetoric,  and  shunned 








period.  .  .  .  In  late‐fourteenth‐ and fifteenth‐century hagiography, holy women 
appear more and more  isolated and male‐oriented.  .  .  . Although holy women 
were,  by  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries,  more  likely  to  be  lay  and 







Both  despite  and  because  of  the  different  historical  circumstances  described  here, 
Hildegard  and  Joan  also  illustrate  Jo  Ann  McNamara’s  argument  that  the  status  of 
mystics  increased  from  the  twelfth  to  the  fourteenth  century,  but  declined  in  the 
fifteenth  century  (1993,  9–27):  initially  the  help  of  mystics  was  enlisted  against 
potential  heretics;  then  they  became  heretics  themselves.  First  their  text  was 
welcomed  and  accepted,  but  later  the  texts  and  their  authors were  denied  validity. 
Hildegard lived in an era and locale in which mysticism flourished, but Joan was not so 
fortunate  on  either  count.  In  all  of medieval Western  Europe,  France  can  claim  the 
fewest number of mystics (Bäurle and Braun 1985, 2; Dinzelbacher 1985, 17–20)4 — 
and  then  usually  only  ones  who  were  rejected  and  died  for  their  beliefs,  such  as 
Marguerite  Porète.  Not  only  did  Joan  have  to  suffer  at  the  hands  of  a  hostile 
ecclesiastical  court,  she  also  had  to  deal  with  a  cultural  climate  unaccustomed  to 
mystical experiences made public like hers. 
 
Our  essay  intends  to  move  beyond  the  political  level,  however,  by  examining  the 





despite  their  differences  in  time,  place,  and  upbringing,  their  common  goal  was  a 
mission  to  change  what  they  saw  as  great  wrongs  in  their  respective  societies, 
accompanied by a claim to mystical experiences. Scholars have long been divided over 
whether either of these women should be considered mystics. By the classic definition 
of  mysticism,  however,  as  “an  immediate  knowledge  of  God  attained  in  this  life 
through personal religious experience” (Livingstone 1977, 350),5 both would qualify. 
Hildegard  is  often  more  specifically  called  a  visionary,  but  almost  every  modern 
commentary designates her as a mystic.6 Even Hildegard herself refers to her mystical 
tasks: “I beseech you, my Lord, give me understanding,  that by my account  I may be 
able  to  make  known  these  mystical  things”  (Hart  and  Bishop  1990,  309).7  More 
scholars might balk at  Joan’s being called a mystic, but  several have  termed her so.8 
And like other medieval mystics, Hildegard and Joan felt called to intervene in church 
and  state  affairs,  to  complement  mystical  experience  with  commensurate  action 
(Dinzelbacher  1985,  15).  Both women  perceived  themselves  living  in  an  age with  a 
pervasive  power  void  and  felt  the  urge  to  act,  albeit with  different  goals.  Hildegard 
considered her  era  “effeminate”  (Epist.  23,  lines  158–159)  and  the  clergy  lacking  in 
virility,  while  Joan  mustered  sorely  needed  military  momentum  for  the  French 
kingdom.  Both women were  convinced  that,  paradoxically,  a woman was  needed  to 
eradicate  the  effeminacy  of  the  age,  and  both  claimed  the  authority  of  mystical 
experiences  in  this  very  public  mission.  The  crucial  difference  was  how  they 
encountered  their mystical  experiences,  either  by  vision  or  by  voice.  Before we  can 




Both  Hildegard  and  Joan  fit  into  the  classical  hierarchy  of  mystical  experiences  as 
defined  by  Augustine.  The  three  Augustinian  categories  of  vision  experiences  in 
descending order of validity are “intellectuale,”  “spiritale,” and “corporale” (12.7.16). 





than definite words;  the  “distinct  interior voice,” which speaks  in  clear words but  is 
recognized  as  being  inside  the  mind;  and  “the  exterior  voice,  which  appears  to  be 
speaking  externally  to  the  subject  and  to  be  heard  by  the  outward  ear”  (Underhill 
1911,  273).  For  the mystic,  the  first  kind  of  voice —  the  kind  Hildegard  of  Bingen 
experienced —  is  the best. While  the  second  type,  “distinct  interior words,”  is  often 
treated with suspicion by the hearer (274), because these voices are so precise, they 





Even  though  Augustine  distinguishes  between  a  vision  and  voice,  in  the  modern 
scholarly  debate  the  term  vision  is  often  used  to  include  the  auditory.  In  Peter 
Dinzelbacher’s taxonomic work on vision literature, he provides a comparison of the 
occurrence of vision and voice in mystical experiences. He distinguishes among visions 





been  and  is  placed  on  the  visual  experience,  as  even  Evelyn  Underhill  claims  that 
“visions and voices  .  .  .  are  the media by which  the  ‘seeing self’  truly approaches  the 
Absolute”  (1911,  323).  William  James  actually  eliminates  from  his  description  of 
mystical  experience  all  auditory  forms  of  revelation,  with  the  exception  of  music 
(1961, 320, 330). The term “visionary” for a person experiencing a vision, even when 
that experience is accompanied by a voice, shows that sight is the privileged mode of 





visio  Dei  as  the  desired  form  of  communication  with  the  divine,  a  concept  that  is 
grounded  in  the belief  that  the eyes are  the windows to  the soul  (Riehle 1977, 172–
179). With  this widespread endorsement of vision as  the preferred  form of mystical 
experience,  it  is perhaps not  surprising  that  the  learned Hildegard of Bingen  clearly 
privileges vision over voice in her mystical experiences. She fits  into the Augustinian 
hierarchy  the  following  way:  on  her  visions  alone,  she  situates  herself  on  the  two 
highest rungs of “intellectual” and “imaginary,” and concerning her voices, she claims 




these, Hildegard was primarily  concerned with  the  authentication of  her  experience 
and  the  ecclesiastical  sanctioning  of  her  authorship,  a  process  she  pursued  actively 
and relentlessly. During this process, she assumed the expected humble position of a 
woman treading on forbidden ground, which makes of heightened interest the candor 
with  which  she  discusses  the  forms  of  her  mystical  experiences  and  her  rhetorical 
strategies. All of these measures served to fashion her into the most accepted female 
authority of  the  twelfth  century  and helped  to  assure  the orthodoxy of  her mystical 
experiences  and  to  validate  her  as  an  author  in  the  eyes  of  the  ecclesiastical 
authorities. 
 
Hildegard’s  three  visionary  books  contain  introductions  explaining  her  authorial 
activity and emphasizing the authentication of her visions. The prologue to her Scivias, 





est  uox  de  caelo”)  (Hart  and  Bishop  1990,  59).  Her  visions  are  flamelike  —  like 
Ezekiel’s — and the voice clearly commands, “Say and write what you see and hear” 




writing,  speak  and write  these  things not by  a human mouth,  and not by  the 
understanding  of  human  invention,  and  not  by  the  requirements  of  human 
composition, but as you see and hear them on high in the heavenly places in the 
wonders of God. Explain these things  in such a way that  the hearer, receiving 
the words  of  his  instructor, may  expound  them  in  those words,  according  to 
that will,  vision and  instruction. Thus  therefore, O human,  speak  these  things 






only  after  the  repeated  command  from God  the Master Author  and,  as  she  relates  a 
page later, only after she has refused and has been subsequently struck down by God 
with  illness.  All  of  these  humility  gestures,  of  course,  served  to  release  her  from 
potential  criticism  by  the  patriarchal  hierarchy.  Second,  she  has  also  been  liberated 
from the constraints of scholastic rhetoric, a statement that can be taken as an implicit 
criticism of a system that did not grant women the same scholastic education as men.12 
Third,  the visions and  instructions are geographically  fixed  in  “heavenly places,” not 
on earth. The prologue testifies also to her being one of St. Matthew’s pure‐hearted, as 
she  is  said  to have visions because she  is pure  in spirit (Scivias, 1,  lines 45–46). The 




In  a  letter  to  Guibert  of  Gembloux,  who  later  became  her  secretary,  Hildegard 





climbs  in  this  vision,  through  the  changes  of  atmosphere,  to  the  top  of  the 
firmament and spreads itself out amongst different peoples, although they are a 
long way  away  from me  in  distant  regions  and  places.  And  since  I  see  these 
things  in  this  way  in  my  soul,  I  therefore  also  see  them  according  to  the 
changing of  the  clouds  and of  other  creatures. But  I  do not hear  these  things 
with my outer ears, nor do I perceive them with the rational parts of my mind, 
nor with any combination of my five senses; but only in my soul, with my outer 





“heavenly  places,”  and  thus  her  visions  also  qualify  as  “intellectual”  and  highly 
acceptable.  She  is  quick  to  disavow  further  physical  involvement  by  rejecting  the 
influences  of  ecstasy,  although  this  sets  her  apart  from  many  mystical  authors, 
including Augustine (Baumgardt 1948, 281 ).14 One reason for her rejection of ecstasy 







that when  I  recall what  I have seen and heard,  I  simultaneously see and hear 
and understand and, as  it were,  learn  in this moment, what  I understand. But 








Thus, Hildegard  asserts  that  she does not  understand what  she does not  see, which 
implies  that  voice  alone  would  not  suffice  to  relate  the  message.  Even  when  she 
acknowledges  the  auditory  aspects  of  her  visions,  she  paints  another  tableau:  not  a 
human  voice,  but  a  flame  or  a  cloud,  traditional  Old  Testament  images  of  God, 
especially  as  experienced by Moses or Ezekiel.17 The voices,  then,  are of  the highest 
intellectual kind and eradicate any human verbal aspect in favor of the highest visual 
imagery. This puts Hildegard on  the  top rung of mystical experience and asserts  the 
importance for her and other mystics of vision over voice. 
 
Furthermore,  to  cement  validation  of  her  experiences,  Hildegard  used  the  correct 
rhetorical  topoi;  she wrote  in Latin,  the  language of  the Church.  “It  has been  rightly 







Hildegard’s  superior auditory experience  is matched by her visionary experience,  as 
she distinguishes between two different kinds of  light, producing two different kinds 
of vision: “The light which I see . . . is known to me by the name of the ‘reflection of the 
living  light.’  .  .  .  In  the  same  light  I  sometimes  (but  infrequently)  see  another  light 
which  is  known  to me  by  the  name  of  the  living  light,  but when  and  how  I  see  it,  I 
cannot tell” (Bowie and Davies 1990, 145, 146).18 The first platonic light is the medium 
of most of her visionary  images, but  in  the Living Light  she achieved vision without 
any  sensory  knowledge  or  explanation,  a  true  visio  intellectualis.  Such  a  vision  is 
especially  crucial  against  the backdrop of her  search  for  approval  from  the mystical 
authority  sine qua non, Bernard, who eschewed everything but  the most  intellectual 
type of vision.19 
 
If  Hildegard  can  be  placed  on  the  highest  rung  of  mystical  experience,  that  of  the 
intellectual  visionary,  then  Joan  must  be  placed  on  the  lowest,  that  of  the  purely 
corporeal — and the purely external at that — an issue that was to loom large in her 
Condemnation trial. In relating her first mystical experience, she insisted that she had 





most  popular  saints  in  French  folk  piety  and  her  personal  favorites:  the  traditional 
guardian of  the Franks,  St. Michael;  the  rhetorician,  St.  Catherine of Alexandria;  and 
the saintly cross‐dresser, St. Margaret of Antioch (Wood 1988, 136–137; Tanz 1991, 
127–134),  claiming,  “I  saw  them with my  bodily  eyes  as well  as  I  see  you”  (Barrett 
69).22  Despite  this  assertion  of  the  visionary  nature  of  her  experience,  Joan’s 
descriptions of what she saw were conventional, containing the standard iconography 
of  light,  crowns,  and wings  (Warner  1981,  126,  132–136).  First,  she  sees  only  light 
(Champion  38,  47,  55–56,  122;  Barrett  55,  63,  70,  114),  with  no  physical  form 
(Champion  45–46,  47–48;  Barrett  61,  63),  accompanied  by  a  voice  so  ethereal  in 
nature  that  sometimes  she  cannot  understand what  it  is  saying  (Champion 52,  122; 
Barrett 67, 114);  later, the speakers are described as wearing crowns (Champion 52, 
64;  Barrett  68,  78),  but  Joan  resists  pressure  to  provide  any  further  description, 
appealing  instead  to  the  records  of  her  examination  at  Poitiers  (Champion  53–54; 
Barrett 68–69); eventually, she admits to seeing their faces (Champion 64; Barrett 78) 
and even to touching them (Champion 152–153; Barrett 129–130), but when pressed, 




It  is striking that,  throughout her Condemnation trial,  the emphasis of her testimony 










them  in  the  same  form;  and  their  heads  are  richly  crowned.  Of  their  outer 
clothing she does not speak; of their robes she knows nothing. 
 














added  that  she  did  not  know whether  they  appeared  to  have  arms  or  other 
members.  She  saw  they  spoke  very well  and beautifully;  and  she understood 
them very well. 
 





she might  have  seen —  a  charge  laid  heavily  against  her  in  the  Ordinary  trial,  that 




her  mystical  experience  reflected  in  her  testimony  that  she  “recognize[d]  them  by 








than  vision:  in  Article  X  of  the  seventy  drawn  up  after  the  Preparatory  trial,  for 






on  voice  striking,  especially  given  that when  the  twelve  articles were  drawn  up  on 
which  she  was  to  be  convicted,  the  focus  dramatically  changed:  in  that  purported 
summary  of  Joan’s  experiences,  they  are  presented  not  as  verbal  but  as  visual  and 











here,  it  was  both.  But  in  the  Nullification  trial,  submission  to  the  church  was  the 
foremost question;  the  issue of  Joan’s  voices was practically nonexistent. As Charles 
Wayland  Lightbody  points  out,  “It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  Church  avoided 
pronouncing  on  the  divine  inspiration  of  Joan’s  ‘Voices,’  in  the  Process  of 
Rehabilitation.  This  touchy  question  was  left  over  for  the  controversies  of  future 
generations” (1961, 140). At the Nullification trial, those who mention her voices at all 
are  few — her confessor,  Jean Pasqueral;  two of her companions,  Jean de Metz, who 
talks  about her  “brothers  in Paradise,”  and  Jean d’Aulon;  the one  remaining witness 
from Poitiers, Séguin de Séguin; and a few of her former judges at Rouen, Jean Fabri, 
Pierre Miget, Martin Ladvenu, Jean Beaupère, and Thomas de Courcelles, still skeptical 
as  to  the divine nature of  the  voices — and  almost  always  as  a  “voice”  or  “counsel” 
(Pernoud  1955,  162,  166,  87,  101,  191–193,  200,  215,  226,  229;  Lang  1895,  208). 
Furthermore,  mention  of  the  voices  is  lacking  entirely  from  either  of  the  articles 






In  fact,  in  a more general  sense,  Joan was  allowed  to  “rewrite” her  testimony at  the 
conclusion of  the Preparatory trial  (Barrett 156–157; Champion 132–133) when she 
asked  “that  the questions and answers should be read consecutively  to her and  that 
which  was  read  without  contradiction  on  her  part  she  allowed  to  be  true  and 
confessed”  (Barrett  133).28  At  the  conclusion  of  the  reading  and  after  some 
modifications  of  the  text,  “Jeanne  confessed  that  she  believed  she  had  spoken  well 
according  to what had been written  in  the register and read  to her”  (Barrett 133).29 
Despite  these  revisions,  the  final  conclusion  of  her  judges  at  Rouen  was  that  her 
revelations  were  “fictitious”  (“ficta”)  (Champion  289;  Barrett  338)  —  a  word  that 
suggests  the  failure  of  her  text  to  convince  her  audience  as  to  its  basis  in  actual 
experience. 
 
In contrast, Hildegard never had  to submit  to an ecclesiastical  trial, but she had  two 
ecclesiastical  favors  to  seek:  authentication  of  her  visions  and  validation  by  the 








Scivias, Hildegard  is  told:  “You may not  see  anything  further  regarding  this mystery 
unless it is granted you by a miracle of faith” (Hart and Bishop 1990, 149).31 In Vision 
Four of Book Three, the voice of her vision makes it unmistakably clear what its source 
is:  “And as  I  looked at  this,  I heard  from Heaven a  terrifying voice,  rebuking me and 
saying,  ‘What  you  see  is  divine!’”  (357).32  Although  her  descriptions  of  the  visions 
contain many references to divine iconography, such as Hildegard’s description of God 
on his  throne,  the divinity of  the voice accompanying her visions  is most clearly and 
beautifully  stated  in  the  Liber  vitae  meritorum.  Hildegard’s  visions  are  repeatedly 
accompanied (more than thirty times) by the sentence “These things that you see are 
true,  and  as  you  see  them,  so  they  are”  (Hozeski  1994,  47).33  Since  this  work  of 
Hildegard’s strikes a heavy exhortatory note to sinners, she constantly reinforces her 
claims  to  the veracity of her visions. But  it  is after  the extensive pronouncements of 
the  voice  that  the  visions  are  true  that  the  voice  from heaven34  reveals  itself  as  the 
Logos in his redemptive mission — the voice is therefore foregrounded by the vision. 
Found  at  the  end  of  the  Liber  vitae  meritorum,  the  statement  is  a  summary  of 
redemptive  history  from  the  viewpoint  of  Christ  as  he  experiences  his  part  in  it.  It 
contains passages like this: “I am the power of the Divinity, which was before eternity 
and before time and which did not even have a beginning in time, for I am the power of 
the Divinity by which God made all things that are to be discerned and probed .  .  .  .  I 
then  became  like  a  flame,  and  approaching  the womb  of  the  Virgin,  I  rested  in  it.  I 







To  achieve  the  second  objective,  authorization  by  the  Church,  Hildegard  looked  to 
others  besides  Bernard  of  Clairvaux  for  ecclesiastical  support  and  sanction.  She 
enlisted  the  support of  three different ecclesiastics: her  scribe Volmar, Bernard,  and 
Pope  Eugenius  III.  As  her  scribe,  Volmar  helped  with  her  first  rite  of  passage  into 
authorship.  Many  medieval  women  writers,  even  if  they  themselves  could  write, 
employed  scribes  for  two  reasons.  First,  a  male  scribe  —  usually  a  cleric  —  lent 
credibility  to  a  female  author36  and  could  speed  her  acceptance,  since  through  this 
method  a  male  member  of  the  Church  at  least  implicitly  sanctioned  what  she  had 
created.  Second,  scribes  allowed women  to maintain  the  appearance  of  illiteracy  as 
part  of  donning  the  wimple  of  humility.  The  manuscript  illustration  titled  “The 
Seeress” on the first page of the Scivias exposes the ambiguity of Hildegard’s humility; 
she  is  shown  sitting  in  the middle  of  the  arch  of  a  small  room, writing  on  a  tablet, 
visibly inspired by flamelike light from above, while Volmar is sitting outside the arch 
of  the  room,  literally  marginalized,  with  only  his  head  peeking  into  the  realm  of 
Hildegard. He is entirely idle, holding what could be another empty tablet, but clearly 
not  engaged  in  any  writing  at  that  point.  As  this  illustration  shows,  Volmar  was 
present to authenticate Hildegard’s vision and creative process, but he assumed only 
ancillary status as a scribe, merely copying her first drafts and smoothing out stylistic 







Through  this  vision  which  touches  my  heart  and  soul  like  a  burning  flame, 
teaching me  profundities  of meaning,  I  have  an  inward  understanding  of  the 
Psalter,  the  Gospels,  and  other  volumes.  Nevertheless,  I  do  not  receive  this 
knowledge in German. Indeed, I have no formal training at all, for I know how 
to read only on the most elementary level, certainly with no deep analysis. But 





self‐proclaimed  “elementary”  literacy  and  understanding,  and  especially  denies  the 
use  of  the  vernacular  in  her  visions.  Hildegard  adds  to  this  that  she  is  seeking 
Bernard’s  advice  because  she  is  afraid  of  heresies,  a  reference  to  the many women 
drawn  to  the  heretical  sects  of  the  twelfth  century.  Bernard’s  reply  to  Hildegard 
assures  her  of  the  orthodoxy  of  her  visions  because  they  fall  into  the  intellectual 




while Hildegard again presented herself humbly,  this  letter has a  certain  immediacy 
and urgency that  implies  that even an  infallible pope might not know everything: “O 
gentle father, poor little woman though I am, I have written those things to you which 





your  soul may be  crowned, which will  be pleasing  to God.  In  their  instability, many 
people, those wise in worldly things, disparage these writings of mine, criticizing me, a 
poor creature formed from a rib, ignorant of philosophical matters” (32).40 Two points 
stand out: Hildegard’s  implication  that either  some ecclesiastics or Eugenius himself 
are too worldly, and her advice to Eugenius to have the same purity of sight in judging 
her writing that Matthew requires and that she possesses. She closes the letter with an 
admonition,  “Do  not  spurn  these  mysteries  of  God,  because  they  have  a  necessity 
which  lies  hidden  and  has  not  yet  been  revealed”  (33).41  Subsequently,  the  pope 
approved her writings and  thereby validated her  status as prophetess. Given  such a 





For  Joan,  the process of authorizing her voices was entirely different, as  she did not 
seek ecclesiastical support in the first place, perhaps because as a laywoman she was 
not as  theologically aware as Hildegard or because she demonstrated  the distrust of 
the  unlettered  for  the  learned.  Given  the  duplicity  of  her  examiners  at  Rouen,43  it 
comes  as  no  surprise  that  Joan  was  reluctant  (what  her  judges  called  obstinate) 
(Champion  317–318;  Barrett  273)  to  discuss  her  mystical  experiences:  a  constant 
refrain in her trial was to insist “I will not tell you” (“Ego non dicam hoc vobis”) or to 
request  “pass  that  question”  (“Transeatis  ultra”)  (Barrett  46; Champion  41).  Unlike 
Hildegard, who was  ordered  by  the  voice  accompanying  her  visions  to  reveal  those 
visions, Joan felt compelled to keep her revelations secret (Champion 93; Barrett 101): 
“She replied that concerning her father and her mother and what she had done since 
she  had  taken  the  road  to  France,  she  would  gladly  swear;  but  concerning  the 
revelations  from God,  these  she  had  never  told  or  revealed  to  anyone,  save  only  to 
Charles whom she called King; nor would she reveal them to save her head” (Barrett 




compulsion  to  keep  her  counsel  secret  (Champion  29–30;  Barrett  50),  Joan  never 
sought  to  have  her  revelations  sanctioned  by  the  Church.  Although  she  heard  the 
voices as often as  three  times a week,  she  remained silent about  them  for over  four 
years — much  like Hildegard, who  saw  visions  for  half  her  life  before  she  revealed 





as her faith,  .  .  . she had not consulted a bishop or a priest about her voices to 
receive  their  approval.  Joan  had  trespassed  gravely.  It  mattered  less  what 





and  as  a  laywoman  she  had  no  right  to  trust  in  them  without  the  formal 
permission of the Church. (1981, 228) 
 





authority  of  the  institution whenever  it  conflicts with  his  private  vision.  The 
weight  of  numbers  and  of  persons,  traditions,  convenience,  decency,  and 
respectability count for him as nothing in comparison with his inner conviction. 
Indeed,  too  large  a  dose  of mysticism  can  destroy  even  the most  efficient  of 
institutions.  Under  the  circumstances,  what  is  surprising  is  the  Church’s 
remarkable capacity  for keeping  the Christian mystics within  its  fold, and not 
only keeping them there but using them to revitalize itself . . . . In general, with 






If  we  accept  Warner’s  assertion,  then  we  must  seemingly  discount  the  clergy  who 
examined  Joan  at  Poitiers — but  Joan  seems  to  have  done  that  very  thing  herself.47 
Although she appealed to the records at Poitiers to bolster her answers concerning her 
revelations  (Champion  53–54;  Barrett  68–69),  indicating  that  she  understood  the 
importance of having written validation and verification of her voices similar to that 
given  to  Hildegard  through  scribal  transcription  of  her  visions,  Joan  insisted,  upon 
direct examination, that “for believing in her revelations she did not ask the advice of 
bishop or priest or any other” (Barrett 190).48 Her judges at Rouen hammered away at 
this  point,  in  obvious  disregard  for  whatever  the  decision  of  the  committee  of 
examiners at Poitiers had been to sanction her mission — and, presumably, her voices 
(Champion  56–57;  Barrett  71).  Instead,  her  accusers  in  Rouen,  slightly  overstating 
their  case,  complained  that  concerning  her  revelations,  “she  consulted  no  bishop, 
priest  or  other  prelate  of  the  Church,  or  any  other  cleric  to  discover  whether  she 
should give credence to such spirits; and declares that she was forbidden by her voices 
to  reveal  these  communications  to  anyone  except  a  captain  of  soldiers,  to  the  said 
Charles, and  to other purely secular persons”  (Barrett 190).49 Even after  twenty‐five 







authorship  of  reported  vision —  transmission  of  text — or  the  authorization  of  the 
Church that Hildegard so enjoyed.50 This latter point is critical. Joan’s accusers insisted 
that  as  “an  unlettered  and  ignorant  woman”  (“mulier  illiterata  et  ignorans”) 
(Champion 305; Barrett 264), she must submit to their  instruction, as Hildegard had 
done voluntarily. Furthermore, they claimed that Joan lacked a sign, especially the sign 
of  humility51  that  Hildegard  did  so  much  to  cultivate.  This  disparagement  of  her 
character  (“qualitate  personae”)  (Champion  338;  Barrett  289)  was  phrased  as 
criticism of the text of her life as well as of her revelations. She was commanded by the 
Inquisition “to reform yourself and your sayings and correct them by submitting your 
acts and your words  to  the Church, and by accepting her  judgment”  (Barrett 307).52 
Like  editors  in  a  publishing  house,  her  judges  seem  to  be  asking  for  an  extensive 
rewrite of both her  life and her experiences — a revision,  if we can use  the word of 
Joan,  of  her  implicit  and  explicit  text  creation.  Joan’s  failure  in  this  creation  and  its 
subsequent authorization resulted — in sharp contrast with Hildegard’s successes in 
these areas — in Joan’s judges declaring that “These revelations so invented had been 
as  it were  the  root which  had  induced  her  to  so many  other  crimes”  (Barrett  274–
275);53 in other words, her revelations had led her to heresy in the view of at least that 
tribunal of the Church, thus landing Joan in the midst of the very charge of heresy that 
Hildegard had worked  so hard  to  avoid  concerning her own visions. One  reason  for 
Hildegard’s success in avoiding such an accusation was her ensuring that her imagery 
came  mostly  from  the  writings  of  Scripture,  while  Joan’s  failure  may  be  that  her 
descriptions seem to have been based on the images and statues of saints and angels 














“voiceary,”  experiencing  corporeal,  external  voices  but  refusing  to  reveal,  beyond 







even  for  a  moment.56  Furthermore,  Joan  insisted  that  her  voices  spoke  to  her  in 
French, the language of the people, rather than in Latin, the language of the Church, or 
in  English,  the  language  of  her  captors,  and  she  had  never  spoken  in  detail  of  her 
voices to her confessor or, prior to her trial at Rouen, to any cleric — thereby denying 
her any assistance in ecclesiastical authentication of her experience. Thus, in the oral 
nature  of  Joan’s  revelations,  in  her  sometimes  contradictory  wording  of  those 
experiences, resulting  in a  lack of convincing text,  in the very  language  in which and 
with  which  her  revelations  were  expressed,  and  in  her  failure  to  obtain  Church 
approval,  Joan  failed  as  a  mystical  author  where  Hildegard  had,  centuries  before, 
succeeded. 
 
In  twelfth‐century  Germany,  where  mysticism  was  a  more  common  phenomenon, 
Hildegard  and  her  visions  were  more  readily  accepted  —  making  it  all  the  more 
significant  that,  despite  the  generally  receptive  conditions,  Hildegard  went  to  such 
trouble to make sure her visions and her writings were endorsed by the Church, while 
Joan,  living  in  an  era  less  friendly  to  mystics,  seems  to  have  not  understood  the 
necessity for such an endorsement at all. Nevertheless, despite the comparative safety 


























next  two  were  actual  trials,  the  Ordinary  and  the  Condemnation  trials  in  Rouen. 
Twenty‐four  years  later,  the  Nullification  trial  reversed  the  charge  of  heresy  — 
although a bit too late for Joan. 
 
4. Dinzelbacher  lists  the  only  French  women  with  mystical  experiences  in  the 
thirteenth  and  fourteenth  centuries  as  Alpais  de  Cudot  (1211),  Marguerite  Porète 
(1310),  Doucelina  de  Digne  (1214–1274),  Beatrix  de  Ornacieux  (1303),  and 
Marguerite d’Oingt (1310) (1985, 17–20). 
 
5.  For other definitions of mysticism,  see Weeks 1993,  1–13,  especially 3,  7,  9;  Zum 
Brunn and Epiney‐Burgard 1989, xiii‐xxxiv, especially xvii–xviii. 
 
6. Liebeschütz  notes  that  her  mode  is  closer  to  prophetism  (1930,  51).  McGinn 
classifies her as a pure visionary (1994, 333–337). 
 




1962,  Lerner  1993,  Michelet  1967,  Stolpe  1956,  Underhill  1911,  Zum  Brunn  and 
Epiney‐Burgard 1989. 
 
9. Despite Dinzelbacher’s  final  two categories,  the preferred but not always accurate 






11.  “Sed  quia  timida  es  ad  loquendum  et  simplex  ad  exponendum  et  indocta  ad 
scribendum ea, dic et scribe illa non secundum os hominis nec secundum intellectum 
humanae  adinuentionis  nec  secundum  uoluntatem  humanae  compositionis,  sed 
secundem  id quod ea  in caelestibus desuper  in mirabilibus Dei uides et audis, ea sic 
edisserendo proferens,  quemadmodum et  auditor uerba praeceptoris  sui percipiens, 
ea  secundum  tenorem  locutionis  illius,  ipso  uolente,  ostendente  et  preacipiente 
propalat. Sic ergo et tu, o homo, dic ea quae uides et audis; et scribe ea non secundum 
te  nec  secundum  alium  hominem,  sed  secundum  uolentatem  scientis,  uidentis  et 
disponentis omnia in secretis mysteriorum suorum” (Scivias, 1, lines 10–21). 
 







tempus  semper  fruor,  cum  iam  plus  quam  septuaginta  annorum  sim.  Spiritus  uero 
meus,  prout  Deus  uult,  in  hac  uisione  sursum  in  altitudinern  firmamenti  et  in 
uicissitudinem diuersi aeris ascendit, atque inter diuersos populos se dilatat, quamuis 
in  longinquis  regionibus  et  locis  a me  remoti  sint.  Et  quoniam  hec  tali modo  uideo, 
idcirco etiam secundum uicissitudinem nubium et aliarum creaturarum ea conspicio. 
Ista  autem  nec  corporeis  auribus  audio  nec  cogitationibus  cordis  mei,  nec  ulla 










raptures,  self‐inflicted  pain,  and  fits  of  demon‐conquering were  the  hallmark  of  the 
visionary” (78); hence, as so often was true of Joan, even the descriptions she offered 









tempus  habeo,  ita  quod,  quoniam  illud  aliquando  uiderim  et  audierim,  recordor.  Et 
simul uideo et audio ac scio, et quasi in momento hoc quod scio disco. Quod autem non 
uideo, illud nescio, quia indocta sum. Et ea que scribo, illa in uisione uideo et audi, nec 
alia  uerba  pono  quam  illa  que  audio,  latinisque  uerbis  non  limatis  ea  profero 








in  eodem  lumine  aliam  lucem,  que  lux  uiuens  mihi  nominata  est,  interdum  et  non 
frequentur  aspicio,  quam  nimirum  quomodo  uideam  multo  minus  quam  priorem 
proferre sufficio” (Epist. CIII, lines 78, 80–81, 97–99, 261–262). 
 








quite  without  visual  form,  a  sheer  daimonion  about  which  she  talked  with  great 
diffidence and reticence. She speaks only of son conseil [‘her counsel’] . . . Even during 
the  hearings  she  was  very  little  inclined  to  go  into  detail  about  her  visions.  Asked 
about  the  great  light  accompanying  them,  she  said:  passez  oultre  [‘pass  to  another 
question’]” (1959, 223–224). While Huizinga is correct to put the emphasis on the oral 























Interrogata  an  illae  Sanctae  apparentes  habent  capillos:  respondit:  “Bonum  est  ad 
sciendum!” 
 




etiam quod nescit  an  ibi  aliquid  erat  de  brachiis,  vel  an  erant  alia membra  figurata. 
Item dicit quod loquebantur optime et pulchre, et eas optime intelligebat. 
 
Interrogata  qualiter  loquebantur,  cum  non  haberent  membra:  respondit:  “Ego  me 












28.  “quod  legerentur  consequenter  interrogatoria  et  responsiones,  et  ea  quae 
legerentur, si non contradiceret, tenebat pro veris et confessatis” (157). 
 

















35.  “Ego uis diuinitatis ante euum et ante  tempora sum, nec  inceptionem temporum 
habeo.  Vis  enim  diuinitatis  sum,  qua Deus  omnia  discernendo  et  probando  fecit  .  .  . 
Deinde flammanter ueni, ac in utero Virginis eo accenso requieui, et de carne ipsius . . . 






Living  Light  to  Volmar]  and  Hildegard’s  account  of  Volmar  seem  to  hint  that  an 
author’s authority is in some measure enhanced by the presence of a scribe .  .  . Since 
St.  Augustine,  St.  Gregory,  and  St.  Bernard  had  composed  ‘through’  a  secretary, 
Hildegard explicitly claimed her right to compose and asserted her status as an author. 
This authority she traces directly to divine  inspiration, which allowed an  ‘unlearned’ 
woman  to  understand  exegetical  and  theological  matters  for  which  she  was  not 
trained. Hildegard’s special understanding is then further verified by the scribe, who 













39.  “O mitis  pater,  ego  paupercula  forma  scripsi  tibi  hec  in  uera  uisione  in mystico 
spiramine, sicut Deus uoluit me docere” (Epist. II, lines 1–2, 7). 
 
40.  “Vnde  nunc  mitto  tibi  litteras  istas  in  uera  admonitione  Dei.  Et  anima  mea 
desiderat,  ut  lumen de  lumine  in  te  luceat,  et  puros  oculos  tibi  infundat  et  spiritum 
tuum exsuscitet ad opus scripture istius, quatenus anima tua inde coronetur, quod Deo 
placet;  quia  multi  prudentes  de  terrenis  uisceribus  spargunt  hec  in  mutationem 
mentium  suarum  propter  pauperem  formam,  que  edificata  est  in  costa  et  que  est 
indocta de philosophis” (Epist. II, lines 8–15, 7–8). 
 













45.  “Interrogata an de  istis visionibus, quas dicit  se habere,  feceritne verbum curato 






seem  to have been  thorough,  and  its  conclusions on  those voices were  certainly not 
binding on Joan. Scott claims that only two hours were spent on her voices — out of 
three weeks of examination (1974, 42). The conclusion of her examination at Poitiers 
—  “one  can  find  no  evil  in  her,  but  only  goodness,  humility,  virginity,  devoutness, 
honesty,  and  simplicity”  (“mais  en  elle  on  ne  trouve  point  de  mal,  fors  que  bien, 




81,  215),  but  she was  still  not willing  “to  refer  herself  and  submit  to  the  Church  of 







favor  of  Joan  and  subjected  her  to  an  unusually  benevolent  interrogation  for  an 
Inquisition (1991, 245). Given the popularity of the “Merlin prophecies” (Wood 1988, 
138,  141)  and  the  acknowledged  desperate willingness  of  the  French,  including  the 





48.  “de credendo suis  revelationibus,  ipsa non petivit  consilium episcopo,  curato aut 
aliis” (226). 
 
49.  “nec  etiam  super  hoc  consuluerit  episcopum,  curatum  aut  aliquem  praelatum 
Ecclesiae  seu  quamcumque  personam  ecclesiasticam,  an  hujusmodi  credulitatem 
talibus  spiritibus  deberet  adhibere;  quin  imo  praemissa  detegere  alicui  dicebat  sibi 
prohibitum  per  voces,  nisi  duntaxat  primitus  uni  capitaneo  gentium  armorum  et 
praefato Karolo, aliisque personis pure laicis” (225–226). 
 
















56.  Interestingly,  despite  the  controversy over what  Joan  actually  signed during her 
abjuration  (see Scott 1974, 115–117), all  the witnesses  to  that abjuration agree  that 
the first few lines, those dealing directly with her voices, were included: “I confess that 
I  have  most  grievously  sinned,  in  falsely  pretending  to  have  had  revelations  and 
apparitions  from  God,  His  angels,  and  Saint  Catherine  and  Saint  Margaret”  (“je 
confesse  que  j’ay  très  griefment  péchié,  en  faignant  mencongeusement  avoir  eu 




57. Obermeier  is primarily responsible  for  the  theoretical  framework and Hildegard. 
Kennison  is  primarily  responsible  for  Joan  of  Arc. We  also wish  to  thank  Robert  E. 
Bjork,  Laurie  Francis,  Henry  Ansgar  Kelly,  Dhira  Mahoney,  and  Martha  Sullivan  for 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